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vs.
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Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANTS1 PETITION FOR REHEARING

Appellants, Michael C. Thompson and Bruce A. Conklin,
petition this Court for a Rehearing for the reason that this
Court has misapprehended Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-911 et: seq.
(1985) (Utah Antitrust Act) and the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule as it applies to the facts of this case.
ARGUMENT
APPELLANTS1 ANTITRUST CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED
This Court's modified definition of

lf

group boycott" is in

contravention of the expressed legislative intent that the Utah
Antitrust Act is to be construed in accordance with "interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable federal antitrust statutes

Utah Code Ann.§ 76-10-926 (1985).
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As this Court noted, the classic definition of

fl

per se group

boycott" is a situation in which "two or more competitors on the
same level of the market structure agree to eliminate a target
horizontal competitor by combining to deny the target of elements
needed in order to compete."

Opinion at 9.

This Court also recognized that the instant case does not
present the classic per se group boycott situation.
11.

Opinion at

This Court turned away from the established group boycott

definition and analysis and replaced it with a much broader
approach.

Appellants

assert

that

there

is no

apparent

legislative intent to modify the traditional definition of group
boycott.

Moreover, Appellants agree with Judge Orme's dissent

that even under this Court's definition no group boycott existed
in this case.
This Court adopted the following definition of group boycott:

"a method of pressuring a party with whom one has a

dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to withhold, patronage or services from the target."

Opinion at 11-12.

Appellants

had no dispute with any party, either horizontally or vertically.
No patronage or services were withheld, and no target existed.
This Court apparently grouped all entities offering the services
of security guards as the "target."

Such a relationship is

inimical to the term "target," which usually denotes "a person or
business against which competitive aim is taken . . . ."

Reaemco

Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 496 F. Supp. 546, 552 (D.C.N.Y.
1980).

Under the theory that all security companies were the
-3-

target of the alleged boycott, any such (company in existence at
the time could bring an action against Appellants for treble
damages.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-919 (1985).

Certainly, such a

result is not the intent of this Court.
This Court observed that several cases recognize per se
group boycotts between a "single horizontal competitor and a
vertically related company.11

Opinion at 12.

Significantly, in

each case cited (Cascade Cabinet Co. v. Western Cabinet Millwork,
710 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1983); Corn-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669
F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1982); Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.
1981)) there was a specific identifiableientity which had been
singled out as the "target11 of the alleged boycotts.

Appellants

urge that the lack of any such target in the present case

pre-

cludes the finding of a group boycott under this Court's definition, as well as under the traditional definition.
As explained by Judge Orme, commercial bribery is an offense
which has been given its own punishment by the state legislature
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508 (1973).

No legislative policy

requires or provides that when such a bribe is offered to secure
a contract, it results in a violation of the Utah Antitrust Act
as well.

A mere exclusive dealing arrangement violates neither

federal nor state antitrust Law.

Two Cities Sport Service, Inc.

v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291,, 1304 n.9 (9th Cir.
1982).
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Appellants further urge that this Court mistakenly considered Utah Power & Light to be in and of itself the relevant
market for purposes of group boycott analysis.

While it is true

that Utah Power & Light is the largest single employer of
security services in Utah, it is neither the only such employer
nor does it employ a majority of the area's security personnel.
The market for security services is worldwide.

The fact that

Appellants were the only competitors to provide security services
for Utah Power & Light for a period of time cannot rise to
antitrust activity, even assuming the contract was obtained as a
result of commercial bribery.
No evidence in this case suggests a potential for a restraint of trade in any significant market.

If this Court

declines a reconsideration of its opinion, a precedent will be
set allowing an antitrust action in virtually any commercial
bribery scenario.
This Court's opinion will have the additional effect of
introducing doubt and uncertainty into the Utah Antitrust Act.
The legislature apparently attempted to eliminate such uncertainty by particularly describing only four unlawful acts. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-920 (1985).

The additional requirement of

specific anticompetitive intent was correctly recognized by Judge
Orme as a legislative attempt to narrow the scope of the group
boycott crime.

This requirement would avoid a conviction where a

boycott exists without anticompetitive intent.
-5TMP2/lbr-4/l

This analysis

conforms to the longstanding rule that criminal statutes should
be strictly construed.
95 (1820).

United States v. Wiltberger, 5 U.S. 76,

This Court's opinion not only expands the scope of

the group boycott crime but also blurs the bright line between
criminal and noncriminal conduct drawn in the Utah Antitrust Act.
EVIDENCED OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SECRET
INVESTIGATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED
On March 31, 1988, the Utah Supreme Court handed down its
decision in In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation, Supreme
Court Docket No. 20268 (hereinafter referred to as the Investigation Case).

As this Court is aware, that case reviewed the

propriety of the investigation which produced the evidence
against the Appellant's in the case at bar.

The Supreme Court

found that the Subpoena Powers Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-22-1 to
-3, was not unconstitutional on its face. However, the Supreme
Court determined that the Subpoena Powers Act was unconstitutionally applied in the investigation of these Appellants.
Of great significance to this Petition for Rehearing is the
fact that the Attorney General conceded that the Subpoena Powers
Act was unconstitutionally applied.

Investigation Case at 8.

In order for the Subpoena Powers Act to be constitutional,
the Supreme Court required that the following procedural guidelines be followed:

The investigation may be approved only after

the district court has made an objective determination that good
cause has been shown.

Each individual subpoena may be issued

-6TMP2/lbr-4/l

only after the investigating attorney has made a good faith
determination that the testimony or other evidence being sought
is reasonably relevant to the authorized investigation.

Subpoe-

naed persons must be afforded an opportunity to challenge the
subpoena at some time prior to compliance.

The authorizing court

has the power to entertain motions to quash and must quash any
individual subpoena that does not meet an objective standard of
reasonableness.

Each witness subpoenaed must be notified (1) of

the general subject matter of the investigation, (2) of the existence and nature of the privilege against self-incrimination, (3)
that any information provided may be used against the witness in
a criminal proceeding, (4) of the right to have counsel present,
and (5) whether the witness is a target of the criminal investigation.

All investigations must be fully documented and all

such documentation must be maintained by the authorizing court.
The prosecutor may not have a secrecy order with respect to the
entire investigation but must go to the court for an individual
secrecy order with regard to each individual interrogation.
Investigation Case at 15, 23, 30, 34.
As noted, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the investigation conducted by the State's attorney in this case was
unconstitutional.

Specifically, the Court found that each

subpoena issued represented that it had been authorized by order
of the district court and that disobedience to the subpoena was
punishable by contempt of court.
-7TMP2/lbr-4/l

Since the subpoenas had not

been individually authorized and because contempt of court is a
multi-step process, the Supreme Court held that the representations on the subpoenas were misstatements which may have "improperly discouraged the recipients from challenging the subpoenas."
Investigation Case at 38. The Court further observed that "to the
extent that these misrepresentations discouraged Respondents or
other subpoenaed parties from exercising their right to challenge
the subpoenas, they denied rights guaranteed by the Act and by
the Fourth Amendment."

Investigation Case at 39.

The Court also noted that the Attorney General failed to
notify the Appellants prior to interrogation "of the general
nature and scope of the investigation and of the right to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination.

These failures

violated Respondent's State and Federal constitutional privileges
against self-incrimination."

Investigation Case at 39.

Additionally, the Court held that the secrecy provisions of
the Subpoena Powers Act were applied too broadly inasmuch as the
district court ordered that the good cause affidavit itself was a
secret document.

The Court observed that "to the extent that the

concealment of the good cause statement impeded the challenge of
subpoenas or interrogations, it operated to deny rights against
unreasonable search and seizure."

Investigation Case at 40.

Practically all the evidence presented against the Appellants at trial was obtained as the result of this investigation
which the Supreme Court has held to be unconstitutional.
-8TMP2/lbr-4/l

Appellants are aware that this Court has indicated that the
evidence was admissible regardless of the Supreme Court's decision in the Investigation Case,

Opinion at 6,

However, Appel-

lants believe that this Court has overlooked a vital distinction
between the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as it
applies in the typical case of a police officer's good faith
reliance on a search warrant and the very different scenario
presented in the case at bar.
This Court correctly observed that under United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), evidence need not be excluded where
the police officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on an
invalid search warrant.

Opinion at 4.

Similarly, this Court

pointed out that under the analysis of Illinois v. Krull, 107 S.
Ct. 1160 (1987), an officer's warrantless search in reasonable
reliance on a statute does not require exclusion of evidence even
where the statute is later held unconstitutional.
However, the rationale behind Krull is not applicable to the
instant case.

In Krull, the Court observed that where an officer

acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute which is
held unconstitutional, the exclusion of evidence produces no
deterrent effect on officer behavior.
The Court here is not dealing with a police officer but
rather with experienced
General's Office.

lawyers employed by the Attorney

While an officer may not be expected to

analyze the constitutionality of a statute or the propriety of a
-9TMP2/lbr-4/l

warrant, a prosecutor must be expected to engage in such an
analysis.

Further, the Court's assumption that the Attorney

General's Office acted in good faith objective reliance on the
statute impermissibly shifts the burden of showing lack of good
faith to the Appellants.

Such a shift of burden is one of the

reasons Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12 was stricken down.

State v.

Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1987).
Finally, the admission of the Attorney General that the
Subpoena Powers Act was unconstitutionally applied flies in the
face of the assumption that the Attorney General's conduct was
objectively reasonable.

The same office which utilized the

Subpoena Powers Act has conceded that its application of the Act
was constitutionally impermissible.

This fact alone demands that

the convictions be reversed for failure to suppress the evidence
illegally obtained.
CONCLUSION
The issues before this Court are of no small importance and
require a reconsideration of the premises for the Court's decision and a review of its consequences.

Therefore, Appellants

respectfully request that this Court grant the Petition for
Rehearing.
The undersigned certifies that this Petition is brought in
good faith and not for the purpose of delay.
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DATED this

day of April, 1988.
Respectfully submitted,
SESSIONS & MOORE

JOHN F. CLARK
Attorney for Appellants-Petitioners
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I certify that on this 6th day of April, 1988 I caused four
copies of Appellants' Petition for Rehearing to be Hand-Delivered
to the office of the Utah Attorney General.

John F. Clark
Attorney for Appellants-Petitioners

-11TMP2/lbr-4/l

